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lJ:I

REPLY TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Appellees' Statement of Undisputed Facts omits important facts and misrepresents
others, requiring the following clarifications and corrections that correspond lo
Appellees' paragraph number:
2.

Appellees ("Defendants") cite to a contract disclaimer included in an

employment application, provided to Bahnmaier before she was hired. Aplee Fact 2.
Assuming that a document disclaiming contractual liability in a pre-employment
application is binding as a general principle, the disclaimer was not clear in this case, as
the language in the signature line was cut off. It read, "I have read and und [sic] these
conditions of [sic]." R 245-46. Although it may be clear to lawyers what was intended, it
cannot be assumed that a layperson would understand the binding nature of such a
statement. Further, the documents St. Mark's provided Bahnmaier once she began
working for the Hospital indicate its policies represent a contract. For instance, the
Acknowledgment ofHCA's Code of Conduct states the Code contains the "mandatory
policies" of St. Mark's, which Bahnmaier "agreed to abide by," and the Code of Conduct
itself states that each employee must be aware of and follow St. Mark's policies and
procedures. Aplt Facts 3-4.
Further, Defendants omit mention of the "Health Work Environment" manual
V,

provided to employees that set forth St. Mark's "for cause" employment policy, and
which assured employees of "fair application of workplace policies, procedures, and
disciplinary proceedings." See Aplt Facts 5-7.

1
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13.

The parties agree the Substance Use Policy prohibits employees from

reporting to work under the influence or impaired by alcohol or drugs. Aplee Fact 13. It
is also important that the Policy specifies an objective blood alcohol level for what
constitutes presumed impairment due to alcohol, of .04. R 276-77. Obviously, only a
test could prove this 1eve1.
14.

Defendants claim that although the "Substance Use Policy provides

procedures that should be implemented in the event a drug test is administered," the
policy does not require testing in the event suspected drug or alcohol use." Defendants
also suggest that the policy contains an exception for testing "when an employee admits
to being under the influence of alcohol." Aplee Fact 14. Both of these statements are
incorrect. The Policy states, "Employees will be required to participate, at a minimum, in
testing ... upon reasonable suspicion." R 278. It contains no exception to this
requirement.
17.

Defendants cite to Bahnmaier's written warning in May 2011, claiming it

was "a written warning for her first violation of the Substance Use Policy." Aplee Fact
17. But Bahnmaier did not violate Substance Use Policy in May 2011; the Policy was
not even mentioned in the writeup. R 291. Bahnmaier had originally been on call that
day, but had gotten her call shift covered by another employee. She did not come in to the
Hospital, and never attempted to work that day. R 775; see also, R 350 (204: 10-22).
Therefore, she could not have violated the "Substance Use in the Workplace" Policy.
Further, this incident was not considered to be significant, as Corbie Peterson testified
she had no concerns about Bahnmaier leading up to her termination in 2012. R 418

2
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(53:4-6). Likewise, Rytting testified her only concerns with Bahnmaier in 2012 were
that she sometimes became distracted and sometimes disposed of items before they were
used up. R 386 (97: 19-99:19).
21.

Defendants state that Rytting "felt [Bahnmaier] was under the influence of

some substance" on March 29, 2012. Aplcc Fact 21. This language suggests a belief that
she was under the influence of drugs, which is a provably incorrect based on the negative
drug test the following day. R 420 (64:2-5).
22.

Defendants claim that Rytting "received a report that evening from one of

Bahnmaier's coworkers that Bahnmaier appeared to be under the influence of alcohol."
Aplee Fact 22. This grossly overstates the coworker's statement (made three years after
the night in question). The coworker, Shay Thompson, describes Bahnmaier's behavior
the evening of March 29, 2012 as "odd, she was red in the face, she was very emotional
and was having a difficult time," which is undisputed even by Bahnmaier, who
acknowledges crying that evening when Rytting yelled at her when she got to work. See
R 316-17. Although Thompson claimed in 2015 that Bahnmaier's "behavior was similar
to" times when he bad seen her drinking at social functions off-duty, he does not state
vi)

that he actually believed her to be drinking on March 29, 2012, or that he informed
Rytting of such a belief. R 451-52. In fact, Rytting's testimony of what Thompson said
on that night was, "what's going on with Candy, she doesn't seem right, something seems
off." R 393 (128:1-3). Bahnmaier does not dispute that she wac; upset that evening, as
Thompson acknowledged, but being upset is far different than "appear[ing] to be under

~

the influence of alcohol."
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24.

Regarding Defendants' statement that Bahnmaier was wearing her surgical

mask when she talked to Rytting in her office on March 29, 2012, which was after
Bahnmaier had scrubbed in, this statement is true, but incomplete. Bahnmaicr did not
have her surgical mask on when she first spoke to Rytting that evening in the hallway. R
315 (64:18-23). She only put on her mask after she walked into the ~urgical room. Id. at
lines 20-23.
26.

Defendants' claim that "Bahnmaier admits that she 'could' have made a

statement during this conversation [in Rytting's office] that gave Rytting the impression
that Dahnmaier would have failed a drug test" misrepresentes Bahnmaicr' s testimony.
Aplcc Fact 26. Defendants take a sound bite from Bahnmaier's deposition to suggest she
admits giving Rytting the impression that she might have been on something. But on the
whole, Bahnmaier's testimony does not support their assertion. Bahnmaier testified that
on the evening in question, when Rytting asked her what was wrong in response to
Bahnmaier's crying, Bahnmaier told her she was "stressed out about Cali," Bahnmaier's
young daughter, for whom she had had to unexpectedly find a babysitter that evening in
order to take the call shift. R 315 (62:20-21); 317 (72:5-12). Rytting asked Bahnmaier
what she wanted to do, and Bahnmaier responded, "why don't I just go home; you know,
it's not my call," to which Rytting responded, "Just go home." R 317 (72:11-16).
Bahnmaier testified that Rytting never said anything about taking her down for a drug
test. R 318 (76:14-20). When asked whether she told Rytting that she would not pass a
drug test, Bahnmaier responded, "I know I didn't say that, because there was no reason
for me not to." R 320 (81: 10-20). Bahnmaier testified that at the time, in the
4
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conversation with Rytting, the circumstances ofBahnmaier going back home were "no
big deal." R 320 (83:15-19).
29.

Although Brimhall may not have known the circumstances of Bahnmaier

being tested on March 29, he clearly knew about the situation by April 3, 2012, when he
wrote an email to Opheik.ens at her request. See Reply Re: Appellee Fact 30.
30.

Regarding what Brimhall stated in the email to Opheikens on April 3, 2012,

vi

it is important that Brimhall was responding to a request from Ophcikens and was clearly
trying to provide her what she wanted: "Let me know if you need anything else, thanks."
R295.
31.

Defendants claim, "Bahnmaier never disputed the material part of

Brimhall' s report: that he sent it to Peterson, and that Peterson believed it and relied on it
when she terminated Bahnmaier' s employment .... " But there is no evidence of any
contact between Peterson and Brimhall in Defendants' cite to the record ( R 780) or
vJ

anywhere else. In fact, Peterson denied contact with anyone but R ytting and HR about the
situation. R 420 (62:14-16). Bahnmaier pointed out this fact to the trial court. R 1113
(lines 2-6). Oddly, there is no evidence regarding the communications between Rytting
and Peterson, or Peterson and anyone, until days after Bahmaier took the drug test on
March 30, 2012. R 293,295.

~

At any rate, Bahnmaier disputed that Peterson "reasonably believed" that
Bahnmaier came to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol. R 781. This dispute
was based on several facts, including that Peterson did take the most basic step of
speaking to Bahnmaier or any of her coworkers about the night in question. R 781.

s
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Also, Defendants misrepresent Bahnmaier's testimony with respect to her
conversation with Btimha11, suggesting that she might have told him she was drunk the
night before. Aplee Fact 31. Bahnmaier testified, "That's not true." R 322 (90:15-18).
Bahmnaier explained that although she did not recall her whole conversation with
Brimhall, she would not have told him she was drunk the day before because that was not
true, because she had spent the prior day with her daughter, who was four years old in
2012 (she was seven at the time of the deposition). R 322 (91:10-23). Further, it does
not make sense that someone who was about to be drug tested at work would tell a
perfect stranger that she had come to work drunk the day before.
33.

As stated above, Bahnmaier's prior written warning was not for a

Substance Use Policy violation. The Policy is not mentioned in the writeup, and
Bahnmaier never attempted to come to work after drinking alcohol.

ARGUMENT

I.

ST. MARK'S BREACHED ITS CONTRACT WITH BAHNMAIER
St. Mark's claims Bahnmaier's breach of contract claims should fail because it

substantially complied with its "for cause" termination policy, did not treat Bahnmaier
arbitrarily, and is not bound by its "permissive" Substance Use Policy. All of these
arguments are incorrect.

A. St. Mark's did not substantially comply with its policies
Defendants claim, "'substantial compliance' with the purposes of these alleged
employment procedures is all that is required." Aplee Br. at 21-22, citing Piacitelli v.

Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah 1981). But the facts in

6
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~

~

Piacitelli do not support Defendants' suggestion that the Hospital substantially complied
with its Substance Use Policy in this instance. In fact, Defendants' argument focuses
solely on whether it complied with its "for cause" policy, and ignores the "Substance Use
Policy." Although Ilahnmaier disputes that St. Mark's complied with its "for cause"
policy, it is at least as significant to her breach of contract claim that it did not comply
with the Substance Use Policy.
In Piacitelli, the employer, Southern Utah State College, had a progressive
discipline policy that provided for "increasingly severe sanctions before dismissal" - "( 1)
oral warning, (2) written warning, (3) suspension, and (4) dismissal." 636 P.2d at 106566. The policy manual provided that its purpose was "to ensure that fractions,
misconduct, or unacceptable performance is treated in a manner that will eliminate,

vu

correct, or resolve such actions or practices, if possible." Id. At 1066. The Court
reasoned, "It is clear from these statements that the purpose of the progressive discipline
approach is to prevent major acts of misconduct by giving the employee an early warning
of the possible consequences of his persisting in unacceptable behavior." Id. The Court
further noted that "(1) Plaintiff was advised, directly or by inference, of his unacceptable
conduct repeatedly over a period of years, and (2) that he resisted conforming." Id.
Further, "Piacitelli's conflicts with the College were long standing. In his numerous
interviews with his superiors, he was given ample notice that his job was in jeopardy
because of specified deficiencies in his performance." Id Based on these facts, the
Court held, "We therefore sustain the district court's conclusion that the College
substantially complied with the contract requirement of progressive discipline." Id.

7
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Here, the Hospital also had a progressive discipline policy. R 860. But in addition,
it had a "Healthy Work Environment" policy that ensured "fair application of workplace
policies, procedures and disciplinary proceedings.n R 807. It had "A 'For Cause'
Employment Standard in which your employment cannot be ended without a valid
reason." R 81 I. It also had a Substance Use in the Workplace Policy that prohibited
employees from working under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. That eight-page
Policy states, among other things:
•

"To ensure the accuracy and fairness of our testing program, all collection
and testing will be conduct pursuant to guidelines established by the
Medical Review Officers and, if applicable, in accordance with Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) guidelines 1;
a·confrm1atory test; the opportunity for a split sample; review by an MRO,
including the opportunity for employees who test positive to provide a
legitimate medical explanation, such as a physician's prescription, for the
positive result; and a documented chain of custody." R 278.

•

"Employees will be required to participate, at a minimum, in testing as
follows: ... upon reasonable suspicion." R 278 (emphasis added).

•

"Testing for the presence of alcohol will be conducted by analysis of
breath, saliva, blood or other accepted testing methodology." R 278.

•

"Testing for the presence of the metabolites of drugs will be conducted by
the analysis of urine, blood, saliva, or other accepted testing methodology."
R278.

1

SAMHSA's "best practices" for employers include: "Do not take disciplinary action
against a worker or accuse a worker of a policy violation simply because the employee's
behavior seems impaired. Instead, try to clarify the reasons for the employee's
impairment. Tf drug testing is a part of your workplace policy, obtain a verified test
result before taking any action." http: samshsa.gov/workplace/legaVavoiding-problems
(emphasis added)

8
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•

"The NIRO will review all non-negative reports. Any non-negative drug
test result due to a physician-approved medication will be reported as a
negative result. If it appears that the person tested is impaired by the use of
medications for which the employee has a valid prescription, the report
should note that fact. Medications that could affect an applicant's ~bility to
perform his or her job may result in restrictions or recommendations for
accommodation with respect to those tasks." R 278-79.

•

"Any employee whose blood alcohol content exceeds the maximum set
forth in this policy, or tests positive for non-prescribed Controlled
Substances or illegal substances, will be imme<liatdy suspended." R 280.

•

"The Facility will provide employees who test positive with contact
information for substance abuse resources." R 280.
The Policy also states that it must be reviewed during orientation and then

annually with al I employees. R 281.
The Policy's statement that "Employees will be required" to be tested "upon
reasonable suspicion" does not suggest that the policy is permissive, as Defendants argue.
Rather, it indicates what it says - that drug testing is required if an employee is suspected
of being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. St. Mark's did not substantially comply
with this Policy. It did not drug test Bahnamier when she was suspected of being under
the influence of something, and although it tested her the next day, the decision to
terminate her despite her negative result test result does not comply with its policies that
make clear that testing will be fair and objective. St. Mark's actions disregard both the
express language and clear purpose of the Substance Use Policy.
Defendants nonetheless argue, without reference to the Substance Use Policy, that
they have no liability because they substantially complied with the purpose of their "for
cause" policy, because "Peterson had a 'valid reason' to end Bahnmaier's employment: a
9
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second perceived violation of the Substance Use Policy." Aplee Br. at 27-28. But there
are at least two problems with this argument. First, nothing in any of St. Mark's policies
suggest that an employee can be terminated for a Hperceived violation." The policies state
that an employee "will be required" to be tested if there is reasonable suspicion of a
violation, indicating an intent to obtain proof of a violation. Second, the March 29, 2012
incident was not a "second violation," because the first situation Defendants reference
was not a first violation. It is undisputed that in the May 2011 incident, Bahnmaier was
originally on call but got someone to cover her call shift. She did not go in to the
Hospital or attempt to work after drinking alcohol (she happened to be drinking alcohol
with a coworker who was not on call that day). There was therefore no violation of the
Substance Use in the Workplace policy in May 2011, and to the extent Defendants
contend that incident supported Peterson's assumption that Bahnmaier violated the policy

in March 2012, such an asswnption without a confin11ing drug test as required by the
Policy was not reasonable. At a minimum, the question of whether that assumption was
"reasonable" is a question of fact for a jury to decide.

B. The decision to terminate Bahnmaier was arbitrary

In response to Bahnmaier's argument that Defendants' decision to terminate her
was arbitrary, Defendants first attempt to argue about the authenticity of their own
records. Aplee Br. at 28. But the rules regarding authenticity are not onerous: "To
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). Because the personnel documents at issue

10
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were produced by Defendants during discovery in this litigation, Defendants' argument
ahout their authenticity is disingenuous. The authenticity of the documents can be
addressed at trial, but at this time, the Court should presume that the documents are
personnel records from the Hospital, as St. Mark's indicated they were when they
produced them to Bahnmaier.
St. Mark's records support a finding that Bahnmaier's termination was arbitrary.
As to "RD," a surgical nurse, based on changes in her performance and affect, Corbie
Peterson required her to submit to a drug test, and stated the consequences as, "If drug
screen is positive, she will receive disciplinary consequences up to and including
termination." R 1172-73. Unlike Bahnmaier, RD was not threatened with termination
based on suspected drug or alcohol abuse even if her drug screen was negative.
v;J

Regarding "RZ," an emergency care nurse, Defendants understate the conduct for
which she was initially only disciplined in November 2013, and for which she was
terminated in February 2014. See R 1174-76. First, in November 2013, RZ volunteered
to disposed of a narcotic left by a patient, but did not follow the proper procedure and
shortly thereafter, her "ability to perform your job was in question." She then told her
supervisor that if she took a drug test, it would be positive and that she was taking Lortab
(a known narcotic) "on a regular basis." R 1174. She was not terminated at this time;
viJ

she was merely advised, among other things, not to "come to work impaired." Id. In
January 2014, her supervisor found 25 discrepancies in RZ's charting or wasting of
Hydromorphone (another narcotic), and in February, RZ was seen "going through the

11
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medication waste bin, and when confronted [she] stated [she was] just cleaning up after
the messy nurses." R 1176. So not only did St. Mark's not discipline an emergency care

nurse when she first admitted to ta1cing a narcotic regularly and was found improperly
disposing of narcotic, but it let her continue to work such that she had the opportunity to
"improperly dispose of' narcotics 25 times, and did not terminate her until she was
caught digging through the medication waste bin. St. Mark's treatment of RD and RZ,
versus its termination of Bahnmaier without any such proof of talcing any drugs or
alcohol, let alone a narcotic, provide evidence from which a fact-finder could determine
that its treatment of Bahnmaier was arbitrary.

C. St. Mark's is bound by its Substance Use Policy
St. Mark's argues it disclaimed contractual liability though a statement made on
the application fonn Bahnmaier signed when she applied for a job with St. Mark's.
Aplee Br. at 31, citing R 245-46. But the application from 2005 did not govern
Bahnmaier's employment in 2012, if it ever did. Much of the small print in the
application is cut off due to what appears to be fonnatting or spacing problems, and the
statement attached to the signature is likewise cut off, such that it does not make sense.
The complete statement reads: "I have read and und [sic] these conditions of [sic]." Id.
Therefore, it is at least arguable whether Bahnmaier's signature on that 2005 document
means anything.
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the application adequately disclaims
contractual liability, the agreement was clearly supplanted by agreements made after
Bahnmaier started working for St. Mark's. Even as an "at will" employee, Bahnmaier
12
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was provided with the HCA Code of Conduct and had to sign that "it represents
mandatory policies of the organization and agree to abide by it." R 256. Then, by 2006,
she could only be terminated "for cause." R 820. This "for cause" employment
agreement was not set forth in the 2007 and 2008 Rmployment Agreement~ that
Bahnmaicr signed as part of her position on the heart team, as Defendants suggest.

2

Rather, it is set forth in the Healthy Work Environment manual provided to all
viiJ

employees. R 811. That manual also informs employees, "you can be assmed of: . . .A
fair application of workplace policies, procedures and disciplinary proceedings." R 807.
Of those policies, the Substance Use in the Workplace Policy, with its detailed process
for drug testing and requirement that testing occur where there was "reasonable
suspicion," was given particular emphasis. Bahnmaier had to sign a specific statement
stating she agreed and understood the Substance Use Policy, and consented to testing of
her blood, breath or urine "as may be required." R 273. This policy was reviewed
1/jp

annually with all employees. R 281. The combination of these documents - the Healthy
Work Environment manual, the statement agreeing to the Substance Use Policy, the
language of the Substance Use in the Workplace policy itself- along with its repeated

2

Defendants claim that the phrase "this Agreement" in the 2007 and 2008 agreements
Bahnmaier signed that state, ''Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to obligate
HOSPITAL to employ EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms
of conditions of employment" "refers to the Hospital's entire agreement to employ
Bahnmaier." Aplee Br. at 34-35. Defendants do not cite to anything to support this
claim, and their claim is not supported by the plain language of the Agreement, which
clearly refers to the document itself.

"'
13
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emphasis, provides evidence that the Hospital intended for it and its employees to be
bound by the Substance Use Policy.
This Court recently considered an employment case in which the documents
provided to the employee included both a disclaimer of contractual liability and repeated
assurances that employees would not be retaliated against for bringing a complaint.
Reynolds v. Gentry Finance, 2016 UT App 35. The Court stated that "a manual that

'contains clear and conspicuous language disclaiming any contractual liability and stating
[the employer's] intent to maintain an at-will relationship with its employees' will not
raise a triable issue." Reynolds, at 111, citing Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d
997, 1001 (Utah 1991). "The prominence of the text, the placement of the disclaimer,
and the language of the disclaimer are all relevant factors in determining whether a
disclaimer is clear and conspicuous." Id. at 112, citing Tomlinson v. NCR Corp., 2014
UT 55, 1 26, Here, it is undisputed that Bahnmaier was not an "at-will" employee, such
that Bahnmaier could reasonably expect there to be parameters provided by the Hospital
governing her employment. Further, the disclaimer upon which Defendants rely was not
"clear and conspicuous," nor was it contained in an employment manual. Rather, it was
in small print along with other statements, in an employment application in which the

Ct..

statement accompanying the signature line was cut off and did not make sense. Further,
any intent in 2005 that St. Mark's policies were not to be binding was contradicted by the
(\L,

language in the documents that Bahnmaier later received once she became an employee,
particularly once she became a "for cause" employee.
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When a disclaimer is not conspicuous, and employment documents contain
language that indicates to an employee that certain terms govern her employment, the
docwnents taken as a whole "create a triable issue as to whether [the employer] intended
to be contractually bound by its repeated statements" regarding the additional term of
employment emphasized in the document". Reynold't, at ,r,r 16. Further, even if the
disclaimer in the application were clear and conspic.uous, "subsequent expressed or
implied agreements [may modify] the ... employment relationship." Reynolds, at ,I 19,
citing Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d at 1004. "[E]ven where 'an express or implied contract'
governs an employment relationship, 'if an employee has knowledge of a distributed
handbook that changes a condition of the employee's employment, and the employee
remains in the company's employ, the modified conditions become part of the

vu

employee's employment contract."' Reynolds, at ,I 21, citing Ryan v. Dan 's Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395,401 (Utah 1998). This Court in Reynolds expressed its intent that this
theory be applied narrowly. Even so, there is a triable issue of fact as to the parties'
intent here. After applying for her job in 2005, Bahnmaier became a "for cause"
employee, and was required to sign for the Substance Use in the Workplace policy that

~

"required" employees to be drug tested if the Hospital had "reasonable suspicion" that
they violated the policy, and set forth specific requirements for that testing. The Hospital
reemphasized the Substance Use policy annually. Therefore, there is at least a triable
issue of fact as to whether the Hospital intended to be bound by the policy.
Defendants argue that the Substance Use Policy is "permissive, not mandatory,"
because the "acknowledgment card expressly states that drug testing 'may be required."'
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Aplee Br. at 35. It is important that Defendants first raised this "permissive, not
mandatory" argument during oral argument on summary judgment. R 1094 (lines 13-15),
1095 (lines 15-21). Because this argument was not properly raised during briefing at
summary judgment, it should not be considered on appeal. See Romrell v. Zions First

Nat'/ Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980) ("As a general rule, an issue raised initially in
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal .... ") Had the issue been properly briefed,
Bahnmaier would have pointed out the mandatory language in tlie actual policy, which
provides that employees "will be required to participate, at a minimum, in testing ...
upon reasonable suspicion." R 276,278 (emphasis added). This language provides
notice and assurance to employees of the common-sense practice of drug testing
employees who are suspected of being impaired by drugs or alcohol at work as a basis for
making decisions about their employment. Bahnmaier's claim that St. Mark's breached
this agreement must therefore be decided by a jury.

II.

BAHNMAIER'S BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM SHOULD BE REMANDED
WITH HER OTHER BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
Bahnmaier's Complaint alleged that St. Mark's actions in terminating her violated

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because those actions ''were
inconsistent with the agreed common purpose of the parties of supporting the operations
of the hospital, and the justified expectations of Bahnmaier that her employers would
~

abide by their own policies." R 6. Bahnmaier acknowledges the principle of Utah law
that "the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] cannot 'establish new,
independent right or duties not agreed upon by the parties."' Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
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812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). Thus, her claim for breach of this implied covenant hinges
on whether this Court determines she had an express or implied contract with St. Mark's
that was breached when she was terminated under the circumstances at issue in this case.
Banhmaier submits that if this Court reverses on Bahnmaier's breach of contract claims,
it must also reverse on her claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. See, e.g., Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23,232 P.3d 486, ,r 61.

III.

BAHNMAIER'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS SHOULD BE REMANDED

Bahnmaier brought claims for negligence against the Hospital and Rytting for
negligence. R 3-4. At summary judgment, Defendants did not argue that Bahnmaier
could not meet any of the elements of negligence. R 224-25. They did not, for instance,
argue that they did not owe Bahnmaier a duty. Id. Rather, as on appeal, they argued only
vJ

that Bahnmaier's negligence claims were barred by the "economic loss rule." Bahnmaier
responded that the economic loss rule is a theory that applies to business disputes,
preventing claims that involve only economic losses from becoming tort claims. See R
792, citing American Towers Owner v. CII Mechanical, which explained:

~

The 'economic loss rule is the majority position that one may not recover
'economic' losses under a theory of non-intentional tort..... Economic loss
is defined as: '[D]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits without any claim of personal injury or damages to another property . . . as
well as the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in
quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold.'
930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996) (internal cites omitted).

vJ
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The "economic loss rule" is invoked in cases involving disputes over, for instance,
construction defect<;, real estate transactions, and equipmenl leasing. Defondanls have
provided no case law, either at summary judgment or now on appeal, that adopts the
''economic loss mle" in the context of an employment case. Damages due to breaches of
an employment agreement are often not limited to economic losses, as recognized by the
Utah Supreme Court in Cabanes.\' v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486,609 (Utah 2010) (allowing
the plaintiff employee to recover emotional distress damages based on the employer's
breach of its contract). 3 (Defendants did not address the fact that Bahnmaier did not have
a contractual relationship with Rytting, and therefore, her claims against Rytting are not
defined by a contract.) Thus, the rule is simply inapplicable here, and therefore,
Bahnmaier' s negligence claims should be remanded.

IV.

BAHNMAIER PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF HER
DEFAMATION CLAIM AGAINST RYTTING
Bahnmaier claims that Rytting is liable for defamation because she either knew

her statement that Bahnmaier was under the influence of something on March 29, 2012
was false, or she acted with reckless disregard as to its falsity. Defendants argue in
response that Bahnmaier cannot overcome the conditional privilege because "[n]o
reasonable jury could believe that Rytting actually believed her statements were untrue

Defendants state that "Bahmaier argues that the Utah Supreme Court in the Cabaness
decision crafted an exception to the economic loss rule 'in the context of an employment
case, in which a plaintiff alleges emotional distress damages in addition to lost wages."
Aplee Br. at 42. But Bahnmaier does not claim that decision created an exception to the
economic loss rule, but rather, the Court's decision to allow the plaintiff to pursue
emotional distress damages in that case demonstrates why the economic loss rule is
inapplicable to employment cases.
3
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when Bahnmaier herself admits that she 'could' have made a 'smart aleck' remark that
gave Rytting the impression that she would fail a drug test." Aplee Br. at 44. But as set

forth in the Reply lo Defendanls' Undisputed Facts above, Defendants misconstrue
Bahnmaicr's testimony as a whole. Balmmaier testified that when Rytting asked her
what was wrong that evening, in response to Bahnmaier's crying, Bahnmaier told her she
was "stressed out about Cali," Bahnrnaier's young daughter, for whom she had had to
find a babysitter that evening in order to take the call shift. R 315 (62:20-21); 317 (72:512). Rytting asked Bahnmaier what she wanted to do, and Bahnmaier responded, "why
don't I just go home; you know, it's not my call," to which Rytting responded, "Just go
home." R 317 (72: I 1-16). Bahnmaier testified that Rytting never said anything about
taking her down for a drug test. R 318 (76:14-20). Bahnmaier acknowledged that she
did not remember the conversation well at the time of her deposition (three years later),
but when asked whether she had told R ytting that she would not pass a drug test,
Bahnmaier responded, "I know I didn't say that, because there was no reason for me not
to." R 320 (81: 10-20). Bahnmaier testified that at the time, in the conversation with
Rytting, Bahnmaier's leaving was "no big deal." R 320 (83:15-19). It was evident that
Bahnmaier was upset and stressed about her daughter, and Rytting ultimately decided she
did not need to be at work.
Aside from this testimony, Bahnmaier provided several facts that could support a
vJ

juror's determination that Rytting made the statement that Bahnmaier was ''under the
influence" knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for the truth. Defendants'
vJ

suggestion that Bahnmaier cannot make a showing ofRytting's "subjective intent" based
19
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on these facts is incorrect. Aplee Br. at 44. Defendants do not cite to any support for
Gu

their suggestion that a plaintiff must have an admission from the defendant of her
subjective intent in order to make a showing of intent sufficient to survive summary
judgment. The case law states,
To prove knowledge of falsity, a plaintiff must present evidence that shows
the defendant knows the defamatory statement is untrue. Likewise, acting
with reckless disregard as to the statement's falsity involves a showing of
subjective intent or state of mind. The Restatement explains that reckless
disregard as to falsity "exists when there is a high degree of awareness of
probable falsity or serious doubt as to the truth of the statement."

Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ,r 30, citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 600 cmt. b (1977).
Here, several facts provide circumstantial evidence ofRytting's subjective intent,
including the fact that Rytting admits to not smelling alcohol on Bahnmaier, was not
concerned with whether Bahnmaier could drive home and did not make sure that she had
a safe ride home. Further, Bahnmaier was an employee who had never before come to
work under the influence. The work shift at issue started at 7 pm on a Thursday, and
Bahnmaier explained when she arrived that she was stressed and worried about her then
four-year-old daughter, whom she had been caring for and had to find care for in order to
come to work. These facts could support a fact-finder's determination that Rytting did
not actually believe that Bahnmaier was under the influence of anything the night of
March 29, 2012, or that Rytt.ing acted in reckless disregard for the truth. Rytting's
subjective intent is a matter for a jury to decide, based upon these facts.
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Defendants incorrectly suggest that the Utah Supreme Court in Ferguson v.

Williams & Hunt made a broad holding that a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a
defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth "by simply attacking the adequacy of
[Defendants'] investigation." Aplee Br. at 45. This is an incorrect reading of Utah law,
and the Ferguson case in particular, which only held that the defendants' investigation in

that case did "not satisfy the standard of abuse required for the conditional privilege."
Ferguson, at ,r 32. The statement at issue in that case was the defendant law firm's
statements to its client that the firm's partners had concluded that Ferguson was
overbilling for his work. Ferguson, at ,r 9. The Court stated that if the firm partners had
made the statement when they first had suspicions about the plaintiff's billing, without
taking steps "to determine the validity of Mr. Ferguson's billing practices," then "the
~

conclusion might be that despite their suspicions, Defendants entertained serious doubts
[about the truthfulness of their statements to the client questioning the plaintiffs billing]
given that they knew of Mr. Ferguson's upcoming vacations," because the impending
vacation might explain his extra billing prior to leaving. Id. at ,r 31. Since the partners
had taken steps to confirm their suspicions, however, the Court held that "the evidence
does not satisfy the standard of abuse required for the conditional privilege." Id. at ,r 32.
Here, Rytting's statement in the context of what she observed at the time (such as
that Bahnmaier did not smell of alcohol), or could have determined objectively (through a
drug test) if she indeed believed her claim, is analogous to the hypothetical the Court
provided of the law firm attacking Ferguson's billing without doing an investigation,
which it concluded might have supported a finding that the defendants made the
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statement with "serious doubts" as to its truthfulness. Therefore, Ferguson supports
Bahnmaier's claim that she has provided sufficient factc;; from which a fact-finder could
determine that her subjective intent was sufficient to overcome the conditional privilege
that protects the publisher of false statements unless they are made with knowledge of the
statement's falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. Ferguson at ,r 28.
Defendants also suggest that Bahnmaier's testimony that she did not give Rytting
the impression she would fail a drug test is an "attempt[] to contradict her own sworn
deposition testimony," claiming that a "subsequent statement from Bahnmaier that she
could not have given Rytting an impression that she would fail a drug test cannot create a

genuine fact. Aplee Br. at 46. But Bahnmaier provided the testimony upon which she
relies before the sound bite upon which Defendants rely, and it is clear from reviewing
the deposition that Bahnmaier made the latter statement in response to continuing
attempts from Defendants' counsel to get her to contradict her prior testimony. Further, it
is clear from the record as a whole that Bahnmaier was not agreeing with counsel that
Rytting could have had the impression that Bahnmaier admitted she would not pass a
drug test. The full exchange is:
[Defendants counsel is reading from "Exhibit 10," Rytting's April 3 email
to Peterson (R 293)]
Q: After [Rytting] makes the statement about giving you the option, then
she goes on to say that Candy replied, "I won't pass the test, I know I
won't." Do you remember saying that to her?
A: No, I don't.
Q: Do you have any reason to suspect that you - do you disagree with that
or think she's not correct in what she 22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~

A: I just know that either -- I know I didn't say that, because there was no
reason for me not to. And Tam - if you get to know me, I'm a big smart
aleck so it could have been one of those, so I apologize. It could have been
- that could be something misleading but I did not - I did not say that.
Q:YoudidA: In those intentions of feeling like I was guilty of something, because l
was not guilty, I knew - I know that.
Q: So you could have said something to her that gave her that impression?
A: And if I did give her that impression, then in a professional and a
management role, then you go down and test. If there's any suspicion, you
do it. But that was not taken.
R 320 (81:10-82:10).
Later, in the deposition, Bahnmaier clarified again that she never indicated to
Rytting any unwillingness to take a drug test, which was consistent with this testimony.
R 357-58 (232:24-233:4).

As to Defendants' other arguments: Defendants are incorrect that Bahnmaier
raised the issue of the "suspicious disappearance" of the March 39, 2012 email for the
fust time on appeal. Aplee Br. at 47; see R 789 (Facts 47-48). Defendants also are
incorrect that "it is undisputed that when Rytting met with Bahnmaier on March 29,
2012, Bahnmaier wore her surgical mask the entire time." Aplee Br. at 47. The first time
Bahnmaier spoke with Rytting that evening, before she scrubbed in for surgery, she was
not wearing her surgical mask. R 315 (64:18-23). Rytting still did not smell alcohol.
Further, Defendants' claim that "another coworker believed that Bahnmaier was under

~
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the influence of alcohol and that he reported these concerns to Rytting" is also incorrect.
Aplee Br. at 48; see Reply to Appellee Fact 22.
Defendants make these arguments to support its claim that Bahnmaier's challenges
to the adequacy of Rytting's investigation are insufficient to overcome the qualified
privilege. Aplee Br. at 49. As explained above, however, Defendants' analysis is
incorrect under Ferguson. Rytting's statement that Bahnmaier was under the influence of
something without sending her for a drug test, and despite not smelling alcohol on her or
being concerned about her ability to drive home provides sufficient evidence that she
knew her statement was false, or at least made it with reckless disregard as to its falsity.

~

Therefore, Bahnmaier's defamation claim against Rytti.ng should be decided by a jury as should her Intentional Interference claim, which the parties agree relies on the
defamation claim.

CONCLUSION
St. Mark's promised Bahnmaier she could only be terminated "for cause," and
required her to abide by its Substance Use in the Workplace Policy. That Policy
informed Babnmaier she would be required to submit to a drug test if St. Mark's had
~

"reasonable suspicion" that she violated it. Despite that policy, Bahnmaier's supervisor,
Rytting, did not send Bahnmaicr for a drug test when she ostensibly suspected Bahnmaier
of being ''under the influence," and St. Mark's relied on Rytting's disregard of the policy
to support its unsupported belief that Bahnmaier violated the Policy. St. Mark's
disregard of its Policy in light of Bahnmaier's "for cause" status and the Policy's
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requirements constitute a breach of its agreement with Bahnmaier. Further, Rytting's
~

report that Bahnmaier was under the influence despite her acknowledgement that she
cannot tell by looking if someone is impaired by drugs or alcohol, and that she did not
smell alcohol on Bahnmaier, could support a juror's finding that she either did not
believe her report or acted with reckless disregard of the truth. Accordingly, Bahnmaier
respectfully requests that this Court remand all of her claims for trial to a jury.
Dated this 27th day of September, 2016.
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